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Statement of Interest of Amicus Curiae
The American Association of Retired Persons is a not-for-
profit membership organization of persons age 50 and over
comprised of approximately 33 million members nationwide. More
than 148,000 members of the organization reside in Utah. AARP
represents the interests of older persons through legislative,
judicial, and administrative advocacy. In representing these
interests, AARP seeks to enhance the quality of life for older
persons; promote independence, dignity and purpose for older
persons; lead in determining the role and place of older persons
in society; and sponsor research on physical, psychological,
social, economic and other aspects of aging.
Through its programs and policies, AARP also supports
effective consumer protection at the federal, state and local
level. AARP has taken a specific interest in and has been an
effective advocate for its members, and other residential
consumers, specifically low income persons, in assuring
responsible and equitable rate making for utilities regulated by
public service commissions. AARP has intervened as a party in
utility cases in other states and in appeals to appellate Courts
of some utility commission decisions, and has developed and
demonstrated expertise in representing interests of utility
customers. Issues concerning telephone rates are of particular
concern because older persons, many of whom live alone, rely on
the telephone as a link to emergency services, medical care,
family and friends.
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ARGUMENT
I
UTAH CODE ANNOT. § 54-4-4.1(2) (CUM. SUPP. 1991)
VESTING POWER IN A REGULATED UTILITY TO VETO A METHOD
OF RATE REGULATION CHOSEN BY THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION CONSTITUTES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO A PRIVATE
PARTY.
A. UTAH CODE ANNOT. § 54-4-4.1(2)
(CUM. SUPP. 1991) VIOLATES THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S LIMITATION
THAT JUDICIAL POWER BE VESTED IN
THE COURTS.
The judiciary's role in the regulation of public utilities
is clearly defined in Utah Code Annot. § 54-7-15, in that the
Court: is responsible for judicial review overseeing the
determinations of the Public Service Commission (hereinafter "the
Commission"). The Commission is required to assure that "all
charges made...by any public utility... for any service rendered
or to be rendered, shall be just and reasonable" Utah Code Annot.
§ 54-3-1 (1990) . It follows then that all charges that: would be
unjust or unreasonable would be unlawful. Id. The Commission is
an independent agency charged with supervising and regulating
every public utility in Utah.. Id. §54-1-1, 54-4-1.
The function of the judiciary is to review agency action en
an appeal from an aggrieved party. This responsibility requires
Courts to review agency action to ensure that the agency properly
acted within its delegated authority. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. , 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184
(1945); rehearing denied, 107 Utah 530, 158 P.2d 935 (1945). It
3
is the judiciary's role to make certain that agencies abide by
the standards established in their enabling legislation. When
a body possesses the authority to review determinations of an
administrative agency and possesses authority to reject that
agency's decisions, that body is in essence acting as a reviewing
court, and exercising judicial powers.
Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2) (Cumm. Supp. 1991) states:
Not later than 60 days from the entry of an
order or adoption of a rule adopting a
method of rate regulation whereby revenues
or earnings of a public utility above a
specified level are equitably shared between
the public utility and its customers, the
public utility may elect not to proceed with
the method of rate regulation by filing with
the Commission a notice that it does not
intend to proceed with the method of rate
regulation.
The central issue of this appeal is that the application of
Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1991) transforms the
regulated utility into a judicial body by allowing the utility
to reject agency decisions. Such a wholesale granting of
judicial power to a private party is clearly in contravention of
the Utah Constitution, Article VIII § 1, wherein it states that
The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a supreme court, a trial court of
general jurisdiction known as the district
court, and in such other courts as the
Legislature by statute may establish... Id.
If a utility is dissatisfied with a regulatory decision, it
may appeal said decision, if it is a final order, to the
judiciary. Utah Code Annot. § 54-7-15. (1990) The veto
authority granted to a regulated utility company in Utah Code
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Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1991) circumvents these
procedures by taking the judiciary out of the process and
replacing it with the utility itself, a classic case of giving
the hen house keys to the fox.
B. THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
DELEGATE A VETO POWER THAT IT DOES NOT
POSSESS
The Utah Public Service Commission exercises authority to
regulate utilities within the state as delegated to it by the
legislature. The Commission exercises limited judicial powers
in that it is authorized to hold hearings and adjudicate matters
within its sphere of enforcement. The Commission possesses
executive powers because decisions regarding masters of
enforcement are left to the Commission's discretion. In short,
the Commission is charged with the legislative mandate to assure
that all rates charged by utilities are "just and reasonable."
There is no doubt that the legislature has lawfully delegated
some legislative authority to the Commission to be exercised
consistent with specific criteria and standards.
In Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1991) the
legislature attempts to delegate another portion of its powers.
This delegation of authority goes to the very public utility that
would be the subject of a shared earnings plan of the Commission.
In relevant part, the provision states
The public utility may elect not to proceed
with the method of [shared earnings] rate
regulation by filing with the Commission a
notice that it does not intend to proceed
with the method of rate regulation. Id.
This provision authorizes a utility to nullify an order of the
Commission by exercise of a veto.
All orders of the Commission have the force and effect of
law. If a utility charges a rate that is higher than the rata
established by Commission order, the Commission is authorized to
bring suit to compel compliance. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-21
(1990). Until the enactment of Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1991) an aggrieved utility sought relief from what
it thought to be an unjust Commission order from the Courts by
way of judicial review. Now, however, when the Commission
establishes a shared earnings rate plan, the utility may
unilaterally, and without hearing or other public process, elect
not to be bound by an order of the administrative agency that is
authorized by the legislature to regulate the utility. If the
utility did not have this purported authority the Commission's
established shared earnings rate plan would be binding upon the
utility.
The legislature, in effect, has conveyed the power to decide
upon a shared earnings rate plan to the utility itself. A veto,
in the American framework of government, based upon separation
of powers, is "the refusal of assent by the executive officer
whose assent is necessary to perfect a law which has been passed
by the legislative body " Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (5th
ed. 1979). The United States Supreme Court in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919 (1983) held that
Congress does not have the power to veto administrative action.
Congress entrusted the enforcement of its will, as expressed in
a statutory framework passed by both houses of Congress and
signed by the President into law, to the agency's discretion.
In Chadha, the Court determined that a veto exercised by the
House of Representatives is in effect legislative in character.
The Attorney General determined that Chadha should not be
deported. In attempting to override the Attorney General's
decision, "the House took action that had the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch." Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 952. The House tried to force the deportation of Chadha, who
up to that point could legally remain in the United States. The
House by its actions made a law forcing Chadha's deportation.
Id. The Court declared this action unconstitution£il and hel<<
that when Congress legislates it must act in accordance with the
procedures for legislative action established in the
Constitution. Congress does not possess the author ity to veto
action of the executive branch.
Chadha's reasoning compels the same result here. "The
legislative power of the State [of Utah is] vested ... [i]n a
Senate and House of Representatives .... " Utah Const. Art. VI,
§ 1. The prescription for legislative action in article VI
requires every bill to be passed by a majority of both houses of
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the legislature. Id. Art:. VI, § 22. "Every bill passed by the
Legislature, before it becomes a law, shall be presented to the
Governor; if approved, the Governor shall sign it, and thereupon
it shall become a law; but if disapproved, the bill shall be
returned with the Governor's objections to the house in which it
originated ...." Id. Art VII, § 8. The legislative process in
Utah is indistinguishable from the legislative process at the
federal level. This procedure is an "integral part[] of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers." Chadha,
462 U.S. at 946. The Utah state legislature made a deliberate
choice to delegate to the Public Service Commission the authority
to establish rates that utilities may charge. This choice to
delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be
implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in
Articles VI and VII of the Utah Constitution. See Chadha, 462
U.S. at 954. The legislature "must abide by its delegation of
authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or
revoked." Id. at 955. In this case, the delegation of a veto
power over the Commission is to a private party, not even to a
branch of government. If the state legislature does not itself
retain a veto over agency action, then it cannot constitutionally
delegate a veto to a public utility. The legislature can
delegate only those powers that it possesses.
When a utility employs Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1991) to invalidate a shared earnings rate plan established
by the Commission, the utility is acting to veto Commission
action. Absent a utility's attempted veto the rate would become
law. Therefore, the legislature has attempted to delegate
authority, a veto, that it does not possess. The state
legislature is bound by limitations established in the
constitution. The purported delegation of a veto to a utility
of a shared earnings rate is unconstitutional and is a nullity.
Utah has already addressed this issue in other contexts and
found similar delegations of authority to be unconstitutional.
For example, in Revne v. Trade Commission, 192 P. 2d 563 (Utah
1948) the Court ruled unconstitutional a provision which
authorized seventy percent (70%) of the barbers in a specific
area to adopt prices and other business practices and submit
these regulations to a State Board of Barbers. In Revne, Judge
Latimer, concurring with the majority, said the statute "vest^
the operation and control of the law in a group of individuals
who are directly interested in the economical feature of the
act." Id. , at 570. The delegation here is even more focused and
inappropriate, providing a veto power to the singular entity
which would otherwise be subject to a singular Order of the
Commission.
II
BECAUSE NO LEGISLATIVE INTENT EXISTS INDEPENDENTLY
OP THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PORTION OF § 54—4—4.1 THE COURT
HUST INVALIDATE THE ENTIRE STATUTE
Should this Court invalidate Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1991) on constitutional grounds, "[t]he question then
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arises whether the unconstitutional part of the Act is severable
from the remainder of the Act." Utah Technology Finance Corp.
v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 414 (Utah 1986). When a Court holds
a portion of a statute to be unconstitutional, severability of
the invalid part "is primarily a matter of legislative intent."
Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. International Ass 'n of
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 91 (Utah 1977)). Resolution of the
legislature's intent is aided if what remains after severance
"can stand alone and serve a legitimate purpose." State v.
Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah 1990); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934.
The legislature sometimes aids Courts' decisions by including a
"savings clause" within a statute. Union Trust v. Simmons, 116
Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190, 193 (1949).
This Court should infer a legislative intent that the two
subsections are not severable because the two subsections are
predicated upon identical concepts, and cover identical
situations. See Union Trust, 211 P.2d at 193. This conclusion
can readily be drawn because the legislature employed the same
language in the two subsections. See id. The legislature added
Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(1) and (2) (Cum. Supp. 1991) to a
well-established regulatory regime. Severing the challenged
statute as a whole does not directly affect the Commission's
remaining powers. Since these provisions were enacted
concurrently, the legislature must have had the veto provision
in mind when it passed the remainder of the statute and might not
have passed Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1(1), had it not planned
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on passing 54-4-4.1(2) as part thereof.
Ill
"INCENTIVE RATEMAKING'1 AS CONSIDERED WITHIN UTAH CODE
ANNOT. § 54-4-4.1 (CUM. SUPP. 1991) IS INHERENTLY
INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH CODE ANNOT. § 54-3-1. (1990)
The Utah Public Service Commission is required to provide
a system of regulation which assures that
all charges made, demanded, or received by
any public utility, or by any two or more
public utilities, for any product or
commodity furnished or to be furnished, or
for any service rendered or to be rendered
shall be just and reasonable (emphasis
added) Utah Code Annot. § 54-3-1.
The Public Service Commission has appropriately termed that
section of the Utah Code Annot. 54-4-4.1 (Cum. Supp. L991) which
allows the Commission...to adopt a method of rate
regulation...whereby revenue or earnings of a public atility are
shared with the utility and its customers" as authority for
"incentive ratemaking."
The Commission has defined incentive ratemaking as
"regulation that allows the utility to earn in excess of the
authorized rate of return on equity with the hope that such
overearnings will provide a greater incentive to management and
employees to undertake additional efficiencies." Commission
Report and Order, Docket Nos. 90-049-03 and 90-049-06, at p. 83,
(issued June 19, 1991) (hereafter "the Order"). There are no
definitions, standards, criteria, or other words of limitation
within the statute itself.
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Incentive regulation has taken several forms around the
country in the last several years. Almost universally such
measures have been instituted consistent with clearly described
criteria dictating the parameters of such programs including a
requirement that the respective Commission first finds such plan
to be in the public interest, or that such alternate plan is
proposed to do a better job at serving the public interest or
produce lower rates than existing regulation. The legislature
here has not only given the Commission a blank check without
guidance, but has provided the regulated utility the authority
to regulate itself.
Cost of service regulation preceded the Commission's
incentive regulation plan, giving rise to this appeal. Under
this process, public hearings involving public participation,
cross-examination of witnesses, and expert testimony was
conducted. The net result was a rate design structured to yield
sufficient revenues to cover the company's cost of providing the
service and providing investors with a reasonable return on their
investment compared to similar investments consistent with
accepted principles of regulation. See Kahn, The Economics of
Regulation: Principles and Institutions, 2d (1989), and see Utah
Department of Business Regulation v. P.S.C. , 614 P. 2d 1242
(1980).
The rate of return arrived at by the Commission following
this process has always been designated as the authorized rate
of return, or a maximum which the Commission will allow the
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utility to earn if it operates efficiently. It has never been
a guaranteed rate of return, and never been viewed as a floor
rate of return. In fact, in most states and the federal
government, utilities exceeding the authorized rate of return
have been required to refund these excess profits to customers.
See New England Telephone and Telegraph Co.. et al. v. Federal.
Communications Commission 836 F. 2d 1101 (DC Circuit 1987).
Under the Commission's definition of incentive regulation
as translated in the proposed incentive plan contained in the
Order, p. 99, the rate of return which it determines for the
utility is no longer to be treated as a maximum authorized rate
of return but, rather, a starting point. In this plan, the
utility could generate a rate of return of up to 480 be.sis points
above the determined rate of return and still be within its
prescribed sphere of regulation. On its face, such an extreme
range does more than provide an incentive for efficiency; it
provides a mechanism to make a farce of regulation itself. For
if rates are "just and reasonable" based on a rate of return of
12.2% (AARP accepts this finding only arguendo) and the rates,
in practice generate a rate of return of up to 17%, by definition
and logic such rates would have to be unjust and unreasonable
and would be unlawful as inconsistent with Utah Code Annot. §
54-3-1, and with the Utah Constitution Article I, § 7 which
states that "no person shall be deprived of life liberty or
property, without due process of law." Id.
13
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APPROVING AN INCENTIVE REGULATION PACKAGE INCLUDING A
FREEZE ON RATES DURING A PERIOD OF DECLINING UTILITY
COSTS CONSTITUTES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONFISCATION OF
PROPERTY AND IS INIMICAL TO RATEPAYERS INTERESTS.
The Commission has recognized that the telecommunications
industry has been a declining cost industry for several years,
due to lower inflation and the relative efficiency of its newer
technology. In fact, since 1987 the Commission has lowered US
West's rate of return and reduced rates by $35 million (1987 and
1988) by $21 million (Docket #83-049-07) (1989), and by $10.7
million (Docket #90-049-06) (1990). In the case which gave rise
to this action, the Commission ordered further rate reductions
because of overearnings of $19.8 million fOrder, p. 34), and
found that the appropriate allowed rate of return on equity
should be 12.20 percent, fid., at 34)
Virtually all "incentive regulation" plans submitted before
the Utah Commission and implemented around the United States
commence with a rate moratorium on basic service of seme
duration. In Utah, the proposed freeze is four years, (Order,
p. 90). The Company had proposed four years, (Order, p. 34) and
the Division of Public Utilities proposed five years
(Order, p. 34) . The moratorium has no economic basis, but rather
is an attempt to please regulators with a respite from the
intensity of rate cases, and to provide what would appear to be
a benefit for consumers.
However, the moratorium is not a real benefit to ratepayers.
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The Commission, under cost of service regulation, would be
ordering additional rate reductions following the hearings
process to reflect declining costs. Since rates should continue
downward, the imposition of a rate freeze acts to deprive
consumers of their property without the due process of law
required by Utah Constitution Article I, § 7.
AARP generally opposes the transition from cost of service
regulation to incentive regulation as not being in the interests
of residential ratepayers. Incentive regulation plans have not
been shown to create efficiencies or reduce prices. In one of
the clearest examples, New York Telephone just completed an
experiment in incentive regulation including a five-year
moratorium. Setting aside preliminary rate increases that were
sought by the company (consistent with its understanding of the
moratorium on rate increases) New York Telephone sought an
increase of $900 million at the moratorium's conclusion, (see
Case 28961, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rate
Changes, Rules and Regulations of New York Telephone Co. , New
York Public Service Commission) which, if approved, would more
than double residential rates.
AARP believes that pricing flexibility proposals which
usually accompany these proposals (sometimes after a short-lived
moratorium) provide vast opportunities for telephone companies
to cross-subsidize entry into other, potentially more competitive
ventures with funds derived from captive customers using only
basic telephone service offerings.
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AARP's major concern in this area is assuring universally
affordable telephone service, which AARP fears may be at risk if
the incentive regulation plan is allowed to go into effect.
Higher basic rates are a particular concern of older persons.
Older persons generally have a greater need for telephone service
because of their limited mobility, limited income and declining
health. Because older people have incomes lower than the
national average they are particularly vulnerable to regulatory
changes which may raise the price of telephone service. They may
be constrained to stretch their budgets to maintain telephone
service (see The Telecommunication Needs of Older Low Income and
General Consumers in the Post-Divestiture Era, AARP, Washington,
D.C. (1987) .
Oftentimes, incentive regulation plans are posited to be
necessary in order to accelerate modernization of the network and
provide for the advent of new technologies and services,
including data transmission, information services, and video
transmission. However, only 6.6 percent of households headed by
a person 55 or older owned a computer in 1989, compared to 19.5
percent for households younger than 55. Similarly, 5 percent of
households with annual incomes under $15,000 owned computers
compared to 21 percent of households with incomes $15,000 or
greater, and 46 percent with incomes $75,000 or greater. (See
Current Population Reports, Series P-23 No. 171, Computer Use in
the United States: 1989, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census.
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As the Commission itself noted in the Order, p. 90,
We are being asked to make a significant
departure from the current scheme of
regulation in the State of Utah. As noted
by Committee witness Dunkel, traditional
regulation is performing relatively well in
this jurisdiction. Ratepayers have received
a series of rate reductions over the past
four years, the Company continues to earn in
excess of its authorized rate of return and
the telephone network appears to have met
the basic needs of its customers. In
addition, telephone subscribership in the
state is at an all time high level (96.5
percent as of March, 1990) and is well above
the national average of 93.3 percent. No
one argues that the system is perfect, but
concrete evidence that it is failing in any
major respect is absent from this record.
On the other hand, the record in this case
shows that the promised benefits of the
incentive regulation proposals before the
Commission are speculative and the
possibility exists that unless a specific
incentive regulation plan is carefully
crafted, there is risk of harm to the
ratepayers. That could occur in the form of
higher rates than ratepayers would have
otherwise paid, or a windfall to
shareholders in the form of higher earnings
than their investment risk would otherwise
justify, as will be discussed in more detail
later. In light of this, the Commission
must approach the abandonment of traditional
regulation and current methods of balancing
ratepayer and shareholder interests very
carefully. Accordingly, the Commission
finds that there must be evidence that a
specific incentive regulation plan will be
of benefit to ratepayers and in the public
interest before the Commission will adopt
such plan.
AARP believes the record does not support such a finding
17
VCONCLUSION
AARP strongly believes that the veto provision Utah Code
Annot. § 54-4-4.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1991) is an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial and legislative authority to a private
party with an economic interest. Further, since the impact of
such veto must have been in the mind of the legislature when it
enacted Utah Code Annot. § 54-4-4.1, the veto provision cannot
alone be severed.
Assuming arguendo that the veto provision could be severed,
the Court must still overturn the Public Service Commission's
order in that the incentive regulation approved by the Commission
constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process of law and is inimical to the interests of residential
ratepayers.
Respectfully submitted, this 25th day of October 1991.
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